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Recent Proposals in the United Nations to
Amend the Charter
by Michael M. Gunter*
In 1975 the United Nations General Assembly reconstituted its Charter Review
Committee, requesting that it make suggestions concerning the U.N. Charter and the
strengthening of the role of the Organization in world affairs. This article analyzes the
recent major proposals of that Special Committee. The proposals deal with such topics
as peace mechanisms, the ICJ, the Security Council, human rights, economic develop-
ment, and the deletion of anachronisms in the U.N. structure. The author concludes
that none of the proposals are likely to be adopted because, although they have the
support of Third World states, the "Big Four" members of the Security Council oppose
them. Nevertheless, changes in the U.N. Charter will continue to occur through infor-
mal processes, such as reinterpretation of Article provisions and adaptation to chang-
ing political conditions.
I
T HE UNITED NATIONS Charter became partially obsolete even
before it entered into force. This was because the explosion of the
first atomic bomb and the breakdown of Soviet-American cooperation,
occurrences which radically altered the world in which the Charter was
to operate, both took place soon after the document was signed in San
Francisco.' Today, more than thirty years after its creation, the con-
tinually altering international situation and the tripling of the
Organization's membership have resulted in a change in the very ethos
of the United Nations. Certainly, such anachronisms in the Charter as
the reference to an "enemy state" in Articles 53 and 107, and the ex-
istence of the Trusteeship Council as one of the Organization's six
"principal organs" starkly testify to the need for at least selective
amendment. Yet, with a few minor exceptions to be noted below,
comprehensive Charter review, as well as simple amendment,2 have
proved impossible to achieve.
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On these two points, see I. CLAUDE, THE CHANGING UNITED NATIONS 3-47
(1967).
2 The definitive study on Charter amendment in general is R.- ZACKLIN, THE
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIVE INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND
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The general reason for this impasse centers upon the political im-
possibility of achieving the necessary support for amending the
Charter. As David Abshire, then Assistant Secretary of State for Con-
gressional Relations, told a U.S. Congressional Subcommittee hearing
on Charter Review:
Any fundamental changes that might attract the necessary absolute
two-thirds vote .. .for example, abolition of the veto or giving the
Assembly mandatory powers, would almost certainly fail in the
[Security Council] ratification process; while those that might be con-
sidered desirable by the larger powers, some system of weighted
voting in the Assembly, for example, could not realistically be ex-
pected to obtain the requisite [two-thirds] vote [in the Assembly] for
adoption.'
Recently, however, a number of amendments have been proposed in
the General Assembly's Special Committee on the Charter of the
United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organiza-
tion. The main purpose of this article is to analyze these proposals.
First, however, a brief survey of the events which led up to the present
situation is necessary.
II
The Chapter prescribes two alternative methods of proposing
amendments: a case-by-case procedure for suggesting individual
amendments (Article 108) and a conference procedure for carrying out
a comprehensive review of the entire Charter (Article 109). Both
establish, however, a similar set of numerical requirements.
Article 108 simply declares that an amendment comes into force
when adopted by a vote of "two-thirds of the members of the General
Assembly," 4 while Article 109 envisions the possibility of a "General
Conference of the Members of the United Nations for the purposes of
reviewing the present Charter."5 Such a Conference "may be held at a
SPECIALIZED AGENCIES (1968). See also F. WILCOX & C. MARCY, PROPOSALS FOR
CHANGES IN THE UNITED NATIONS (1955); Schwelb, The Amending Procedure of Con-
stitutions of International Organizations, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 49 (1954).
1 Review of U.N. Charter and Establishment of a Commission on U.S. Par-
ticipation in the United Nations: Hearings on H.R. Con. Res. 80, 258 and Similar and
Identical Resolutions, and H.R. J. Res. 1143 and 1144 and Similar and Identical
Resolutions Before the Subcommittee on Int'l Organizations and Movements of the
House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1972).
U.N. CHARTER art. 108.
I Id. art. 109, para. 1.
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date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of the members of the
General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members of the Security
Council." 6 Again, "a two-thirds vote of the Conference" in which
"[e]ach Member of the United Nations shall have one vote" is suffi-
cient to propose an amendment.'
Once an amendment has been proposed in either of the two man-
ners outlined above, it then must be "ratified in accordance with their
respective constitutional processes by two-thirds of the Members of the
United Nations, including all the permanent members of the Security
Council." Thus, any amendment to the Charter must not only be sup-
ported by the Third World states which constitute the majority in the
General Assembly, but also is subject to the veto power of any one of
the five permanent members of the Security Council.
Despite these difficult requirements, the amendment process detail-
ed in Article 108 already has been employed successfully. During the
1960's, to reflect the growth in U.N. membership, the size of the
Security Council was increased from eleven to fifteen members and
that of the Economic and Social Council from eighteen to twenty-
seven, an occurrence which necessitated the amendment of Charter
Articles 23, 27, 61, 9 and eventually 109.10 Then in 1971, the size of the
Economic and Social Council was again increased, this time to fifty-
four. 1 These amendments constitute at least a partial precedent and
practice that may be looked to in the future.
In addition to the procedures for calling a general review con-
ference, Article 109 provides that: "If such a conference has not been
held before the tenth [1955] annual session of the General Assembly . .
the proposal to call such a conference shall be placed on the agenda
Id.
Id. paras. 1, 2.
8 Id. para. 2.
For scholarly analyses of these events, see R. ZACKLIN, supra note 2, at 121-29;
Schwelb, Amendments to Article 23, 27 and 61 of the Charter of the United Nations,
59 AM. J. INT'L L. 834 (1965); and Schwelb, The 1963/1965 Amendments to the
Charter of the United Nations: An Addendum, 60 AM. J. INT'L L. 371 (1966).
10 For a scholarly analysis of the amendment to Article 109, see Schwelb, Entry
into Force of the Amendment to 109 of the Charter of the United Nations, 17 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 1009 (1968).
" For a scholarly analysis, see Schwelb, The 1971 Amendment to Article 61 of
the United Nations Charter and the Arrangements Accompanying It, 21 INT'L & COMP.
L.Q. 497 (1972); and Schwelb, Entry into Force of the Second Amendment to Article
61 of the United Nations Charter, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 300 (1974).
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of that session of the General Assembly. ... 12 In preparation for this
event, the General Assembly adopted a resolution requesting the
Secretary-General to prepare and circulate among Member States the'
following: (1) a systematic compilation of the documents of the United
Nations Conference on International Organization, i.e., the San Fran-
cisco Conference; (2) a complete index of the documents of that Con-
ference; and (3) a repertory of the practice of United Nations organs.13
In 1955, however, "recognising that such a review should [only] be
conducted under auspicious international circumstances," the General
Assembly decided that, although "it is desirable to review the Charter
in the light of experience gained in its operation," the review con-
ference should be postponed until "an appropriate time." In its place,
the Assembly created a committee consisting of all the Members of the
United Nations, "to consider, in consultation with the Secretary-
General, the question of fixing a time and place for the Conference,
and its organization and procedures.' 4 "[V]irtually moribund from the
start of its inauspicious career"' 5 this Committee on Arrangements for
a Conference for the Purpose of Reviewing the Charter met intermit-
tently over the years, the last time in 1967. Although it is still
theoretically in existence, in case any member might request its ser-
vices, no one has sought any further meetings.
The question of Charter review surfaced again in 1969, when it
was included late in the agenda of the General Assembly at the sugges-
tion of Columbia.'1 The matter was postponed until the following year
when the General Assembly asked the Secretary-General to invite U.N.
Members to communicate to him their views and suggestions on the
matter.' 7 When little response resulted, the Secretary-General was re-
quested to repeat his invitation.' 8 Finally, under General Assembly
Resolution 3349 of December 17, 1974, the Assembly established a
forty-two member Ad Hoc Committee on the Charter of the United
12 U.N. CHARTER art. 109, para. 3.
's G.A. Res. 796, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 51, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953).
'4 G.A. Res. 992, 10 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 19) 49, U.N. Doc. A/3116
(1955).
" R. ZACKLIN, supra note 2, at 121.
18 See General Assembly: New Agenda Item, U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan.
1970, at 70.
" G.A. Res. 2697, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 127, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
18 G.A. Res. 2968, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 116, U.N. Doc. A/8730
(1972).
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Nations to: (1) discuss the observations received from U.N. Members;
(2) consider additional proposals for enhancing the U.N.'s ability to
achieve its purposes; (3) review suggestions, not requiring Charter
amendment, for the more effective functioning of the U.N.; and (4)
list any other propositions that aroused particular interest.' 9 U.N.
Members were invited to submit or bring up to date their suggestions
concerning Charter review by May 31, 1975.20 The Secretary-General
was invited to submit to the Ad Hoc Committee his views on the
Secretariat's experience acquired in the application of Charter provi-
sions, as well as to prepare an analytical paper for the Committee on
the relevant views of the U.N. Members. 2' Finally, the Committee
itself was asked to report back to the General, Assembly at its Thirtieth
Session. 12
Resolution 3349, which established the Ad Hoc Committee, was
adopted by a contentious rollcall vote of 82 to 15, with 36 abstentions.
Four of the permanent members of the Security Council (the United
States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France) voted
against the Resolution, a factor which hung heavily over its work. The
Committee's first session, for example, revealed "a fundamental
divergence of opinion on the necessity for carrying out a review of the
Charter." 23
To help reconcile some of these differences, the General Assembly
decided in late 1975 to broaden (and therefore make less controversial)
the Ad Hoc Committee's mandate by reconstituting it as the Special
Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the
Strengthening of the Role of the Organization. 24 The renamed Charter
Review Committee was to examine observations received from govern-
19 G.A. Res. 3349, para. 1, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 148, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974).
20 Id. para. 2.
21 Id. paras. 3, 4.
12 Id. para. 5.
23 Committee Members Differ on Need to Review U.N. Charter, U.N. MONTHLY
CHRONICLE, Aug.-Sept. 1975, at 21.
24 G.A. Res. 3499, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 152, U.N. Doc. A/10034
(1975). See Enlarged Charter Review Committee to Study Strengthening United Na-
tions Role, U.N. MONTHLY CHRONICLE, Jan. 1976, at 71. The second part of the
Committee's name, "The Strenghthening of the Role of the Organization," had its
origin in a General Assembly item to that effect originally submitted by Romania in
1972. See G.A. Res. 2925, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 5, U.N. Doc. A/8730
(1972). The Committee's mandate was renewed by G.A. Res. 31/28, 31 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 39) 180, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976).
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ments concerning: (1) "suggestions . . . regarding the Charter" and (2)
proposals for the "strengthening of the role of the United Nations with
regard to the maintenance and consolidation of international peace
and security, the development of co-operation among all nations and
the promotion of the rules of international law in relations between
States."2 In performing its mandate, the Committee was requested to
accord "priority to the consideration of those areas on which general
agreement is possible. "26 Its size was increased to forty-seven by adding
five new members. 2" In addition, the Secretary-General was requested
to prepare an analytical study of the various proposals, including those
dealing with Charter amendments, submitted by the governments.
2 8 It
is to the recommendations emanating from this Committee that the
present article will now turn.
III
It should be clear from the outset that we are dealing here with
mere proposals, not formal amendatory submissions. These proposals,
in the main, have been proffered by certain Third World states plus
Romania and Yugoslavia. With the exception of China, the permanent
members of the Security Council have opposed the trend, seeking to
divert the Special Committee to more innocuous pursuits.
2 9
21 G.A. Res. 3499, supra note 24, at para. 1.
26 Id. para. 2.
27 Id. para. 3.
28 Issued as Analytical Study Submitted by the Secretary-General Pursuant to
General Assembly Resolution 3499 (XXX), 31 U.N. GA, Special Committee on the
Charter of the United Nations and on Strenthening of the Role of the Organization
[hereinafter cited as Charter Comm.], U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.2 (1976). This docu-
ment, together with other documents of limited circulation and the summary reports
of the 15th to 20th meetings of the Charter Committee, can be found in Report of the
Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of
the Role of the Organization, 32 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 33), U.H. Doc. A/32/33
(1977).
29 See, e.g., the statement by the U.S. representative in 31 U.N. GA, Charter
Comm. (8th mtg.) 6-8, U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/SR.8 (1976). China, on the other hand,
has taken a position of general support for many of these amendatory proposals in an
effort to cast herself as the only great-power friend of the Third World. Speaking sole-
ly in generalities, for example, the Chinese delegate declared that "truth was on the
side of countries which were in favour of a review and revision of the Charter." 30
U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1578th mtg.) 267, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1578 (1975). For
statements on the opposition to Charter review by the other four permanent members
of the Security Council, see id. at 267-68.
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These contrary purposes came to a head during the spring of 1977
in acrimonious debate over whether or not to annex a document 0 con-
taining proposals for amending the Charter to the Special Committee's
report to the General Assembly. 3' With the breakdown of the
heretofore utilized consensus procedure, an Algerian motion to annex
the document in question was carried by a vote of 30 to 8, with 5
abstentions. Four of the permanent members of the Security Council
were numbered in the opposition; only China supported the majority
which, contended the Soviet delegate, "was illegally imposing its will,"
attempting "to confer on the document a status which it did not have
and to give the impression that it had been approved by the Special
Committee, thus prejudging the latter's future work. 3 2
A. Peace Mechanisms
Possibly the most frustrating failure of the United Nations has been
its inability to maintain international peace and security. Chapter VI
of the Charter deals with the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes." A pro-
posed amendment here to Article 33 would "provide a specific pro-
cedure for moving sequentially from two-party negotiations to higher
levels of third-party involvement in intractable disputes." Thus, "par-
ties to a dispute should agree in advance to accept arbitration or
judicial settlement where negotiation, inquiry, mediation or concilia-
tion may prove insufficient." If these procedures prove unavailing,
disputes "containing adjudicable legal elements . . .will . . . be re-
ferred automatically to the International Court of Justice [ICJ] for
judicial settlement." Article 36(1) of the Statute of the ICJ "should be
amended to make this responsibility explicit." Finally, Charter Article
37 should "be revised to provide for the creation of a conciliation and
arbitration commission which should be composed of a small group of
persons universally accepted, such as past presidents of the General
Assembly."3 3
In retort to these suggestions, however, one representative argued
that it "would not be necessary to amend the Charter in order to pro-
vide for third-party involvement" because the "United Nations could
10 Finally issued as Suggestions and Proposals Regarding the Charter of the United
Nations and the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, 32 U.N. GA, Charter
Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.12/Rev.1 (1977).
31 For a summary of this debate, see id. (18th and 20th mtgs.), U.N. Docs.
A/AC.182/SR.18 and A/AC.182/SR.20 (1977).
12 Id. (20th mtg.) 15, U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/SR.20 (1977).
Is Id. U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.12/Rev.1, at 9 (1977).
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provide for a third-party procedure in the multilateral conventions it
produced and could also formulate a declaration laying down the
details and modalities of third-party procedure." Tellingly, this
representative then noted that: "If Member States were not willing to
take such action, amendments to the Charter would not help, and, if
they were willing to do so, there would be no need to amend the
Charter." He, therefore, concluded: "Rather than considering con-
troversial amendments to the Charter, the Committee should concen-
trate on practical methods for improving the dispute settlement pro-
cedure of the United Nations.."'
The breakdown in great power unanimity after 1945 has prevented
the implementation of many of Charter Chapter VII's provisions con-
cerning "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the
Peace, and Acts of Aggression." Consequently, a different, more
modest role for the United Nations developed. The procedure for in-
terposing troops from non-great powers between contesting states has
been variously defined as "peace-keeping" or "preventative diplomacy."3 5
Given this development, the Philippines has suggested that an addition
to Article 40 is necessary to delineate the details of what some have
referred to as "Charter Chapter VI ." This amendment would state:
In particular, the Security Council, in order to prevent an aggrava-
tion of the situation, may, whenever it deems necessary, establish
United Nations peace observation teams and a United Nations inter-
position force (UNIForce) to arrest or prevent violence, and permit
settlement of disputes by the peaceful means delineated in Chapter
VI.36
The guidelines for implementing UNIForce would embody such
principles as (1) "instant-ready" contribution of troops by all U.N.
Members; (2) acceptance of these troops by all states; and (3) financial
support through the regular budget of the U.N. To obviate a repeti-
tion of the events which occurred in May 1967 when UNEF was sum-
marily withdrawn upon the demand of Egyptian President Nasser,
"recall of UNIForce contingents shall require a decision of the Security
Council."3 1
S4 Id. U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.14/Add.3, at 3 (1977).
3' For an able analysis of "the concept of preventative diplomacy which is not to be
found in the theoretical substructure of the Charter," see I. CLAUDE, SWORDS INTO
PLOWSHARES: THE PROBLEMS AND PROGRESS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 312 ff.
(4th ed. 1971).
16 36 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.12/Rev.1, at 10 (1977).
37 Id.
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To further these general purposes, argued another representative,
"the definition of aggression (annex to General Assembly resolution
3314 (XXIX) of December 1974) should be included in the Charter in
some form." 28 Finally, "through disarmament, the great Powers should
provide funds for the maintenance of [UNIForce]."' 9
In opposition to these ideas, one representative declared that: "If
the political will existed, the existing provisions of the Charter relating
to peace-keeping operations should be sufficient." He further observed
that "the absence of specific agreements on peace-keeping operations
was more a function of the fact that States were not prepared to enter
into them."4 0 Another representative felt that "it would be wrong to
encroach on the mandate of the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping
Operations."' 1
B. Strengthening the ICJ
The World Court has been a disappointment to even its most ar-
dent supporters. The immediate reason for this situation is its inability
to maintain a full docket. Although this failure arises primarily from
political rather than procedural causes, '42 many still feel that positive,
procedural adjustments might have a beneficial effect.43
Under the present Charter, the United Nations can only seek ad-
visory opinions from the ICJ; the Organization is prohibited from ini-
tiating contentious cases. An amendment to Charter Article 94 would
alter this situation: "The United Nations and any member may at any
time agree to submit to the International Court of Justice legal aspects
of disputes between them concerning the interpretation or application
of the Charter."" Similarly, Article 34(1) of the Statute of the ICJ
.38 31 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.2, at 36 (1976).
(9 32 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.12/Rev.1, at 11
(1977).
40 Id. U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.14/Add.1, at 6 (1977).
41 Id.
42 "It was ... recognized that there were disputes which could best be settled ...
by other means than judicial settlement." 31 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc.
A/AC.182/L.2, at 59 (1976). In addition, "the role of the Court depended largely on
the attitude of States whose political will was instrumental in making the existing'
system work." Id. at 60.
4' See generally Schwelb, The Process of Amending the Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 880 (1970).
44 32 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.181/L.12/Rev.1, at 13
(1977).
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would be altered to read: "States and the United Nations may be par-
ties in cases before the Court." 45
"Serious doubts were however expressed as to the wisdom of this
proposal.... .The rule that only states could bring cases before the
Court "gave expression to a fundamental principle of internationsl law,
namely the principle of State sovereignty .... ." Granting "the same
prerogative to international organizations would be tantamount to
equating them with States and recognizing the existence of supra-
national subjects of international law .... "46
Charter Article 96, along with Article 65 of the Statute, currently
permit only the General Assembly, the Security Council, and other
U.N. organs and specialized agencies so authorized by the General
Assembly to request advisory opinions. Access to advisory opinions is
thus "too restrictively drawn with the result that little use has been
made of [the] Court in this respect. '47 The Court's role might be made
more effective if, in addition, regional organizations, individual States,
and the Secretary-General were added to the list of those eligible. 48
Objections were made to this suggestion, however, because of the
"risk that a State might try to use the Court for its own purposes by
submitting questions which the other State concerned would have no
possibility of objecting to." Furthermore, "a State which was not
prepared to bring a dispute to the Court under the contentious pro-
cedure might find itself compelled to go to the Court under the ad-
visory procedure." This would be "in violation of the principle that a
State could not be subjected to any type of third-party settlement
without its consent. 49
To expedite the Court's proceedings, "it was proposed that Article
29 of the Statute should specify time-limits within which the cases were
to be heard and determined."50 In addition, "it was suggested that the
chambers which the Court may form in accordance with Article 26
and 29 of the Statute should be made permanent bodies under the
Statute." Along similar lines, "there should be chambers dealing with
," Id. Their sponsor, the Philippines, concluded: "These amendments if adopted
would add substantially to the effectiveness and prominence of the International Court
of Justice in upholding the observance and implementation of international legal
justice .... " Id.
Id. U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.14/Add.4, at 3 (1977).
Id. U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.12/Rev.1, at 13 (1977).
41 See id.
"' Id. U.N. Doc. A/AC/182/L.14/Add.4, at 5 (1977).
3 1 U.N. GA, Charter, Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.2, at 61 (1976).
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inter alia the law of the sea, . . .air and financial law." "[R]egional
chambers or courts as legal forums to reflect the law and traditional
usage of the geographical and cultural areas of the world" were also
proposed."'" In reply, however, another "representative said that the
formation of special chambers would have the effect of dismembering
the Court rather than increasing its effectiveness." 52
C. Security Council
The veto power of the five permanent members of the Security
Council has been a bone of contention since the beginning."S Given the
ever increasing voting strength of the Third World states in the
General Assembly and most other U.N. organs, it was almost in-
evitable that renewed attacks would be made on this citadel of great
power privilege.5 4 These attempts have taken two principal, inter-
related paths: (1) the abolition or at least diminution of the veto itself,
and (2) increasing the number of permanent, as well as non-
permanent, members in the Security Council. Numerous variations of
each have been recommended.
Regarding the veto itself, suggestions have been made, as mention-
ed above, either to eliminate it entirely or at least to exclude it in such
matters as, for example, admission, suspension, or explusion of
Members; the appointment of commissions of inquiry; and decisions
concerning matters other than conflicts endangering peace.55 In retort,
a "number of representatives recognized that one could not realistically
expect the veto to be abolished." It "was the price which had to be
paid in order to ensure the creation of the Organization. 's 6 As another
representative pointed out: "The unanimity principle [i.e., the veto]
was designed to preclude the use of the organization for the interests of
any one particular group of States."57 In addition, "[ilt was questioned
11 Id. See generally Jessup, Non-Universal International Law, 12 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 415 (1973)..
52 32 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.14/Add.3, at 6 (1977).
'3 See R. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: THE ROLE OF
THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1945, at 713-49 (1958).
14 As the Secretary-General's analytical study put it: "Some States were of the
opinion that the right of veto was, inter alia, undemocratic, monopolistic,
anachronistic, and contrary to the sovereign equality of States. 31 U.N. GA,
Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.2, at 45 (1976).
11 See these and numerous other proposed areas in id. at 46-47.
56 Id. U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.8, at 18 (1976).
11 32 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.14/Add.1, at 20
(1977).
1978
774 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. Vol. 10:763
whether the . . .veto was any more discriminatory than the system of
voting [in the General Assembly] which bore no relation to the size and
population of Member States or to other such factors."5 8
Another interesting suggestion concerns the "creation of a new class
of semi-permanent seats." These positions "would be created for each
major world region, to be held alternatively by the major non-
permanent members in the region."59 In reply, however, others argued
"that an extension of the right to veto . . .would run the risk of fur-
ther paralysing the work of the Security Council.."60 Regarding
specifically "a shifting permanent seat," some felt that it "would be
dangerously destabilizing as the fundamental balance of the Council
would shift from year to year, producing inconsistent results."'6 Fur-
thermore, additional permanent members or the creation of a semi-
permanent status "would impair still further the principle of the
sovereign equality of States. -. "62 Enlarging the Security Council
might also reduce the efficiency of a "body which had to make deci-
sions rapidly. . . .There was an optimum size which should not be ex-
ceeded and 15 was somewhere in the range of the optimum. '6
Indicative of the continuing frustration, yet increasingly felt
strength of many small and medium-sized states was a Romanian pro-
posal for "the confirmation by the Charter of the existence of a single
category of States, i.e., equal Member of the United Nations, a
category which must include all the countries of the world without
distinction as to size, economic or military potential or social system.""64
Indeed, "[s]ome States believed that . . . the role or powers of the
General Assembly should be broadened or extended with the General
Assembly playing a greater role than the Security Council." 6
Giving specificity to these general beliefs were such suggestions as
the one which would give the General Assembly more power under Ar-
" 31 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.2, at 48 (1976).
19 32 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.12/Rev.1, at 8 (1977).
In an interesting, but probably unrealistic, reversal of the customarily presumed re-
quirements, the Japanese have suggested that a criterion for becoming a permanent
member of the Security Council be "a positive attitude towards the universal prohibi-
tion of nuclear weapons." 27 U.N. GA, Report of the Secretary-General: Need to Con-
sider Suggestions Regarding the View of the Charter of the United Nations, Agenda
Item 89 (XXVII) 36, U.N. Doc. A/8746, (1972).
1o 31 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.2, at 48 (1976).
61 Id. U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.8, at 18-19 (1976).
62 Id. U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.2, at 31 (1976).
61 32 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.14, at 12 (1977).
64 Id. U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.12/Rev.1, at 6 (1977).
65 31 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.2, at 39 (1976).
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ticle 97 to choose the Secretary-General: "[T]he Security Council
should submit a list of three candidates from which the General
Assembly could select the person to hold the office of Secretary-
General. '66 A proposal made by Ecuador would provide that:
Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the
Security Council, may participate without vote, in the discussion of
any question brought before the Security Council, whenever such
Member considers that its sovereignty and its territorial integrity and
national security are specially affected or are in danger.67
Still another proposal would:
Supplement the provisions of the Charter [Article 15] so as to uphold
the right of the General Assembly to request from the Security Coun-
cil substantive reports on all major problems concerning international
peace and security, and also the right of the General Assembly to for-
mulate .'. . specific proposals concerning the practical activities of
the Security Council."
Suggestive of the smaller states' frequent frustration with mean-
ingless paper victories was a recommendation to: "Include in the
Charter [Article 18] provisions stipulating that the resolutions adopted
by consensus or by a unanimous vote constitute firm commitments for
all Member States." 69 What is more, Romania requested that provi-
sions be added to the Charter "stipulating . the procedures,
machinery or bodies responsible for overseeing the implementation of
the resolutions adopted .. ."70 So that smaller states would not be shut
out of important committees, Romania also recommended that the
membership write "into the Charter the principle of the regular rota-
tion of seats in all subsidiary bodies of the United Nations with limited
membership." 7
60 32 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.12/Rev.1, at 14
(1977).
67 Id. at 8. If implemented, this motion would alter the present procedure laid
down in Article 31 which permits only the Security Council to allow such non-member
participation.
61 Id. at 7.
59 Id.
70 Id. at 16.
71 Id.,
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D. Deletion of Anachronisms
1. Enemy States
Since the Charter was written while the Second World War still
raged, provisions were inserted into it to allow members of the anti-
Hitler alliance to deal with their enemies, unencumbered by their new
obligations as Members of the United Nations. Article 53, for example,
exempts "measures against any enemy state" from having to be
authorized by the Security Council, and Article 107 declared that:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in
relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an
enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as
a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such
action."
These references to an "enemy state" are particularly disturbing to
West Germany,7 2 Japan, and Italy, three present Members of the
organization. Accordingly, many support "the deletion from the
Charter of provisions referring to 'enemy States,' " believing them to be
"anachronistic and obsolete in view of the . . . admission of the so-
called 'enemy States' to the United Nations as peace-loving States and
the conclusion of peace treaties and other instruments among those
concerned." 3 As another representative argued: "In order to avoid
confusion and eliminate any pretext for undue intervention in the in-
ternal affairs of Member States, such clauses should be deleted from
the Charter. 7 4
Those who opposed deletion of the references to an "enemy state,"
however, maintained that they "represented the confirmation and en-
dorsement in international law of the sanctions . . . taken during the
Second World War by the main victorious Powers against the former
enemy States .. ."' Another representative declared that "asking the
" The Soviet Union had hinted in the past that the "enemy states" clause gave it
a special right to intervene unilaterally in a revanchist Germany. For an analysis of this
claim see D. FRENZKE, J. HACKER & A. USCHAKOW, DIE FEINDSTAATENARTIKEL UND
DAS PROBLEM DES GEWALTVERZICHTS DER SOWJETUNION IM VERTRAG VOM 12. 8. 1970
(1971).
11 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 33) 11, U.N. Doc. A/31/33 (1976). See also the
comment of the West Germany delegate supported by the Italian delegate in 31 U.N.
GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/SR.14/Rev.1, at 7 (1976); and that of the
Japanese government in U.N. Doc. A/8746, supra note 59, at 37 (1972).
14 32 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.14/Add.8, at 3 (1977).
I1 d. at 4. "Eliminating the references to 'enemy States' would be undermining
one of the historic foundations of the Organization." 31 U.N. GA, Charter Comm.,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.8, at 8 (1976).
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countries which had been members of the anti-Nazi coalition to agree
to delete the clauses in question could be compared to asking the
former colonial countries to agree that the Declaration on the Grant-
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was no longer
topical since colonialism had been eliminated. '"1 6
2. Trusteeship Council
Although it was established as one of the six principal organs of
the United Nations, the Trusteeship Council (which never played the
major role in decolonization that was originally envisioned for it) has
"virtually lost its raison d'etre."77 As the Guinean delegate once ex-
plained: "No one can conceive of a Trusteeship Council when there
are no more Trust Territories."7 " Since this will be the very situation
when Micronesia, the last Trust Territory, enters into its new relation-
ship with the United States, many might support the Mexican
delegate's recommendation to strengthen the General Assembly's
Special Committee on Decolonization, possibly "elevating it to the rank
of a Council, to replace the Trusteeship Council, whose existence was
no longer called for."7 9
Related to this general matter is another proposal for "the deletion
from the Chapter of . . . [Articles 73-74] referring to de facto accep-
tance and recognition of the rights of a State ... to have colonies...
and . . . the proclamation by the Charter of the full and final aboli-
tion of colonialism, neo-colonialism and racism .. ."80 In reply to
this, however, others "pointed out that the Charter had very effectively
contributed to the process of decolonization and the achievement of in-
dependence by a great many States ...... Thus, there "was no reason
. . . to delete the relevant parts of the Charter." '
3. Other Matters
Some felt Charter Chapter XVII, "Transitional Security Ar-
rangements," which in Article 107 contains the previously mentioned
76 32 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.14/Add.8, at 5 (1977).
11 31 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.2, at 75 (1976). For
several years now, it has been impossible to even obtain a constitutional membership in
the Trusteeship Council due to the decline in the number of members administering
trust territories. For an able analysis of this anomalous situation see Blum, The Com-
position of the Trusteeship Council, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 747 (1969).
78 14 U.N. GAOR, (857th plen. mtg.) 785 (1959).
79 31 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 33) 26, U.N. Doc. A/31/33 (1976).
80 32 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.8, at 7 (1977).
81 Id. at 9-10.
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reference to "enemy states," might be deleted in its entirety because it
"described a transitional situation which had been superseded by other
proposals, '8 2 namely the United Nations system itself. Other represen-
tatives, however, "recalled that no peace treaty had been signed by all
States involved in the Second World War and that the Allies had
taken certain decisions that were still in effect." Specific "[r]eference
then was made to . . . the Allied forces . . . stationed in Berlin in ac-
cordance with the Articles of the Charter [106-07] mentioned .. ."'3
Some felt Article 109(3), which calls for a General Conference to
Review the Charter by the Tenth Session (1955) of the General
Assembly to be placed on the agenda of that session, is also obsolete
"since . . . it dealt with something that was already supposed to have
taken place."84 Finally, declared another delegate, "the use in Article
38, paragraph 1(c), of the ICJ Statute of the word 'civilized,' " con-
stitutes "another anachronism . . . on the elimination of which a con-
sensus could . . . be easily arrived at."85
E. Human Rights
Presently, the United Nations deals with the question of human
rights at a variety of different points, including ECOSOC's functional
commissions on Human Rights and the Status of Women, as well as
the General Assembly's Third (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural)
Committee and regular plenary session. To integrate all these steps
and, in general, give the subject more prominence, some have propos-
ed the creation of a Human Rights Council as one of the principal
organs of the United Nations. This recommendation might be im-
plemented in one of two manners: (1) "the functions of the
Trusteeship Council should be expanded . . . [to] protecting human
rights in general . . . so that it would become a 'Human Rights and
Trusteeship Council,' incorporating some of the committees [now]
dealing with those subjects;" 6 or (2) ECOSOC's "Commission on
82 Id. at 9.
83 Id. U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.14 Add.8, at 4 (1977).
84 31 GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.8, at 9 (1976).
65 Id.
8 32 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.12/Rev.1, at 13
(1977). Although it was not unanimous in its recommendation, a prominent U.N.
report recently mentioned the possibility of adopting a Charter amendment which
would transform the Trusteeship Council into a Human Rights Council. See U.N.
Social and Economic Council, A New United Nations Structure for Global Economic
Cooperation: Report of the Group of Experts on the Structure of the United Nations
System, U.N. Doc. E/AC.62/9, at para. 62 (1975).
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Human Rights should be elevated to a full Council .. "87
Several representatives objected to the first option "on the ground
that the structure of the Trusteeship Council was fairly rigid and that
it was difficult to see how its terms of reference could be changed to
enable it to deal with questions concerning the protection of human
rights." Some showed skepticism because "there were already several
bodies active in this field and . . .what was needed was more action
and not more bureaucracy." These representatives also mentioned "the
danger that the bureaucratic procedures adopted with regard to
human rigths would create illusions while camouflaging reality." 88
Others noted that since it was an organization consisting of sovereign
Member States, "ensuring the actual implementation of human rights
posed a difficult task for the United Nations." 89
F. Economic Development
Given the influx of impoverished, Third World states into the
United Nations during the past two decades, it seems almost inevitable
some would find "that in the economic and social fields the Charter...
anachronistically defined international co-operation in vague terms as
a charitable and minor activity."9 0 There certainly is truth to such
assessments. After all, the Charter basically was written by the great
power victors of World War II. While they did list "international co-
operation in solving international problems of an economic, social,
cultural, or humanitarian character" as one of the purposes of the
United Nations in Article 1(3), as well as devoting Charter Chapter IX
to "International Economic and Social Co-Operation" and Charter
Chapter X to the establishment of "The Economic and Social
Council," there is no doubt that they felt the primary purpose of the
United Nations was to "maintain international peace and security"
(Article 1(1)).
Critics of the present situation, therefore, have sought to make
economic development more salient in the Charter. Mexico, for exam-
ple, has suggested that "international co-operation for development"
and "collective economic security" be added to the purposes and prin-
ciples of the United Nations enunciated in Charter Chapter 1,91 while
B 32 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.12/Rev.1, at 17
(1977).
88 Id. U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.14/Add.5, at 7 (1977).
"9 Id. at 3.
90 31 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.2, at 67 (1976).
91 32 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.12/Rev.1, at 12
(1977).
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Iran and numerous other states have recommended that "the salient
elements of the new international economic order should be in-
corporated into the Charter." 92 Furthermore, to provide the necessary
leadership and coordination to achieve economic development, some
felt that ECOSOC had to be given a new mandate with sufficient
authority. The Philippines thus proposed the following amendment to
Article 63(2): "It [ECOSOC] shall co-ordinate the activities of the
specialized agencies and make the decisions subject to General
Assembly approval on over-all policies, direction, allotment of tasks,
scope, content and size of programmes and interrelationship of agen-
cies."9 1
Other representatives, however, "stressed that the United Nations
was essentially a political organization whose primary role . . .was to
maintain international peace and security." The U.N. was "not an in-
ternational economic organization or a world planning commission
where mandatory rules could be established for the economic, social
and technological development of all Member States. ' 94 Also, "there
was no reason for revision of the Charter in the field under consider-
ation" because "many of the relevant proposals submitted by Govern-
ments, such as the idea of collective economic security, were [already]
contained implicitly or explicitly in the Charter." '5 Furthermore, "the
adoption of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and
the results of the sixth and seventh special sessions of the General
Assembly showed that the United Nations was [already] in a position
to take effective decisions corresponding to the special requirements of
developing countries, particularly in the economic field."96 Finally, it
"was noted in this connexion that the changes proposed in the report
of the Group of Experts on the Structure of the United Nations [for
Economic Cooperation], although broad in scope, did in no instance
necessitate amendment of the Charter."
9 7
G. Disarmament
Although Charter Articles 11 and 26 specifically confer, upon the
General Assembly and Security Council respectively, special respon-
12 31 U.N. GA, Charter Comm. (12th mtg.) 11, U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/SR.12
(1976).
" 32 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.12/Rev.1, at 12
(1977).
4 Id. U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.14/Add.4, at 5 (1977).
96 31 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.2, at 68 (1976).
9" Id. at 68-69.
9" 32 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.14/Add.4, at 8 (1977).
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sibilities in the field of disarmament, many have long felt a sense of
failure in what the United Nations has been able to accomplish.
Nevertheless, the "view was expressed that disarmament was the cor-
nerstone of the edifice of the United Nations and that any revisions of
the Charter required or presupposed that condition."98 To give this
feeling substance, Mexico suggested that "general and complete disar-
mament under effective international control" be added as one of the
principles and purposes of the Charter listed in Chapter L" Another
representative "stressed" the "necessity . . . of providing for a disarma-
ment organ of the United Nations."100  A third delegate, however,
pointed out that the amendatory "proposals relating to disarmament
had been limited in scope in view of the negotiations regarding the
convening of a special session of the General Assembly to consider the
question."10' Still another representative observed that the present
Charter "offered many possibilities for the discussion and solution of
the problems of disarmament," adding that "no less than 29 resolu-
tions . . . had been adopted on disarmament by the General Assembly
at its last (1975) session ..... This representative concluded: "[T]here
was therefore no need to envisage other forums for the discussion of
the problems in question." Indeed, "in his view, revision of the Charter
could not contribute to and would in fact hamper efforts aiming at
disarmament. "102
IV
This article has analyzed the major amendatory proposals to the
United Nations Charter which recently have been advanced in the
General Assembly's Special Committee on the Charter of the United
Nations and on the Strengthening of the Organization. Although they
are numerous and in many cases strongly supported by their
98 31 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.2, at 26 (1976).
" 32 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.12/Rev.1, at 5 (1977).
100 31 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.2, at 27 (1976).
101 32 U.N. GA, Charter Comm. (16th mtg.) 2, U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/SR,16,
(1977). Illustrating the resentment some felt against the superpower domination of the
field, the Mexican delegate declared: "It should be clearly understood ... that as long
as the discriminatory United States and USSR co-Chairmanship of the Conference of
the Committee on Disarmament continued, the effectiveness of any measures would be
limited." Id. On this point, see also 31 U.N. GA, Charter Comm., U.N. Doc.
A/AC.182/L.8, at 21 (1976).
102 Id. U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.8, at 24 (1976).
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adherents, none are likely to be adopted in the near future because
four of the five permanent members of the Security Council oppose
them.
The reasons for this opposition appear varied at first, but upon
closer analysis largely boil down to a desire on the part of the United
States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and France to prevent
the Third World majority from bending the United Nations even more
to its will, which is the likely result of most of these proposed amend-
ments. As disagreeable as the present situation may be at times, a
United Nations altered along some of the lines suggested above prob-
ably would prove intolerable for the Big Four. Due to the fear of set-
ting off "a chain reaction of new proposals,"'10 although the amend-
ments enlarging the Security Council and ECOSOC "had had no
destabilizing effect,"'10 4 even innocuous sounding suggestions, such as
the deletion of the references to "enemy state" in Articles 53 and 107,
have met with almost impassioned opposition.
This impasse, however, does not mean that the Charter slowly will
become obsolete. In the first place, informal or de facto amendment
already has occurred through (1) reinterpretation of various Articles;
(2) non-application of certain Articles; and (3) the conclusion of sup-
plementary agreements or declarations which interpret and thus, in ef-
fect, amend the Charter. 06
In addition, one suspects, as the Egyptian delegate put it, that:
"The need was not so much to revise the Charter, which had proved to
be a flexible instrument capable of adaptation to changing conditions
in the world, as to modify the behavior of certain States which violated
its provisions."' 0 6 Indeed, an analysis of the documents produced by
the Special Committee on the Charter reveals again and again an in-
nate feeling that what is needed is the "political will" to implement the
Charter. As one representative asserted: "No improvements of the pro-
visions of the Charter and no structural changes in the Organization
would replace the political will of Member States to discharge their
obligations under the Charter and implement its provisions.' 0 7
-0- Id. U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.2, at 16(1976).
104 Id. at 17.
101 For a discussion of these informal amendment possibilities see F. WILCOX &
C. MARCY, supra note 2, at 10-23.
1o* 31 U.N. GA, Charter Comm. (8th mtg.) 2, U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/SR.8
(1976).
107 Id. U.N. Doc. A/AC.182/L.10, at 9 (1976). For additional references to this
"political will" to implement the Charter, see id. U.N. Docs. A/AC.182/L.2, at 11
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Nevertheless, the above analysis of recently proposed amendments
to the U.N. Charter holds more than merely academic interest. Not
only does it reflect the current mood of many Members, but it may
even contain a preview of future amendments to the Charter. After
all, what is impossible today does not have to remain so forever.
(1976); (12th mtg.) 4, 11, A/AC.182/SR.12, (1976); and 32 U.N. GA, Charter
Comm., U.N. Docs. A/AC.182/L.14,at 3 (1977); A/AC.182/L.14/Add.2, at 9 (1977);
and A/AC.182/L.14/Add.l,at 6, 8 (1977).

